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Recent years have seen an increase in the application of ideas from the social sciences to
computational systems. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the domain of multiagent
systems. Because multiagent systems are composed of multiple individual agents interacting with
each other many parallels can be drawn to human and animal societies. One of the main challenges
currently faced in multiagent systems research is that of social control. In particular, how can open
multiagent systems be conﬁgured and organized given their constantly changing structure? One
leading solution is to employ the use of social norms. In human societies, social norms are essential
to regulation, coordination, and cooperation. The current trend of thinking is that these same
principles can be applied to agent societies, of which multiagent systems are one type. In this article,
we provide an introduction to and present a holistic viewpoint of the state of normative computing
(computational solutions that employ ideas based on social norms.) To accomplish this, we (1)
introduce social norms and their application to agent-based systems; (2) identify and describe a
normative process abstracted from the existing research; and (3) discuss future directions for
research in normative multiagent computing. The intent of this paper is to introduce new researchers
to the ideas that underlie normative computing and survey the existing state of the art, as well as
provide direction for future research.
Norms, Normative Agents, Agents, Agent-Based System, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-
Based Modeling
 Introduction
The past decades have seen an increase in the use and acceptance of agent-based systems
across a broad number of ﬁelds that range from economics to biology (Galan and Izquierdo 2005).
This growth is partly due to an interest in modeling social problems and simulating complex social
conditions that do not easily lend themselves to traditional mathematical models. As a result, ideas
from the various branches of the social sciences have been explored to solve hard problems in
computer science. In this paper, we are interested in a problem that is shared between sociology and
multi-agent systems known as social control (Mukherjee et al. 2007). Research on social control
addresses the challenge of ensuring that a system operates efﬁciently while at the same time
allowing the individual agents maintain their freedom (Verhagen 2000). On the frontier of this
research, social norms are being investigated for their potential use in implementing social control in
multi-agent systems (Therborn 2002). In this approach, which we call the normative approach, social
norms act as behavioral constraints that regulate and structure social order within a multi-agent
system and promote cooperation and coordination between heterogeneous agents in open systems
(Boella and Torre 2007).
The normative approach can be realized through normative multi-agent systems that combine social
norms and multi-agent systems. Normative multi-agent systems offer the ability to integrate social
and individual factors to provide increased levels of ﬁdelity with respect to modeling social
phenomenon such as cooperation, coordination, group decision making, organization, and so on in
human and artiﬁcial agent systems (Boella et al. 2007). Additionally, normative multi-agent systems
offer a tool to examine sociology through the perspective of methodological individualism (Neumann






individual actors and study the emergent phenomenon. To accomplish this, methodological
individualism investigates the feedback mechanisms present in society as well as the system
dynamics.
Normative multi-agent systems are composed of normative agents. Normative agents must satisfy
the regular notions associated with artiﬁcial agents and possess the capability to: represent norms in
a format that allows them to be reasoned over and modiﬁed during the lifetime of the agent
(knowledge representation); recognize and infer the norms of other agents based on observations
and interactions while not confusing the norms with individual rules and constraints (learning theory);
transmit norms, in both an active and passive fashion, to other agents (communication and network
theory); and sanction other agents who do not comply with known norms if those norm require it
(morality and law). To date, implementations of normative agent architectures are largely based on
the belief, desire, and intention (BDI) architectures of computer science and remain uninﬂuenced by
the conclusions of psychology, pedagogy, and neurophysiology (Neumann 2010).
In this paper, we extend the current body of research on normative multi-agent systems by
introducing a process driven norm life cycle model that is based on the most recent empirical results
and theoretical and philosophical ideas. In addition to describing and discussing our model, this paper
is intended to serve as survey of the current ﬁeld of normative systems and as an introduction for
new researchers in the ﬁeld of normative systems and the computational study of norms. These
survey and introduction goals are accomplished by highlighting the major areas of current research
and discussing how they ﬁt together into a holistic picture.
The structure of this paper can be brieﬂy summarized as follows. First, we introduce the concept of a
norm and identify the essential characteristics. We then illustrate the richness of the philosophical
normative landscape by discussing the past approaches used to categorize norms and create norm
typologies. Next we introduce the methods used to represent norms in computational systems before
ﬁnally deﬁning normative multi-agent systems. Following our presentation of normative multi-agent
systems, we introduce our normative process model and structure its description around previous
research that supports each component. After describing each process, we look ahead to the
challenges that still exist and discuss where future research might be best focused.
We have tried to restrict our focus to work done in the ﬁeld of normative systems and not the broader
social sciences. Through this approach we hope to better underscore the necessity of
interdisciplinary cooperation and illustrate, through leaving explicit gaps and using general
explanations, where there is a need for further reﬁnement in our theories. Some of these reﬁnements
may already exist in ﬁelds unknown and unexplored by researchers of normative systems. Others
still may not yet be conceptualized.
 What is a Norm?
The literature is populated with numerous of deﬁnitions and uses of the term norm (Horne 2001). The
lack of a consistent deﬁnition makes it difﬁcult to describe any sort of general normative process or
discuss the life cycle of norms in general. However, by closely examining the literature on normative
agents and normative multi-agent systems, we have identiﬁed a number of varied but conceptually
consistent deﬁnitions that, taken together, form the general concept of a norm as it is used in much of
the work surveyed for this paper. To facilitate an understanding of generalized norms, we ﬁrst
examine how the existing deﬁnitions of a norm are reﬂected in the literature, starting with its use in
the sciences and then looking at its use in multi-agent systems. We then identify the essential
characteristics of a norm and conclude with a short discussion on how two particular aspects of a
norm can create scenarios that are not typically encountered in traditional multi-agent systems that
use rational agents.
Normative Deﬁnitions
The Webster online dictionary (Merriam-Webster 2010) provides three deﬁnitions for the term norm:
1.  an authoritative standard
2.  a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or
regulate proper and acceptable behavior
3.  average:
a.  as a set standard of development or achievement usually derived from the average or
median achievement of a large group
b.  as a pattern or trait taken to be typical in the behavior of a social group
c.  as a widespread or usual practice, procedure, or custom
These deﬁnitions are representative of the term as used in the various areas of normative research,
including deontic logic, legal theory, sociology, social psychology and social philosophy, decision





In deontic logic, a norm is viewed as an obligation or a permission that an individual has to a larger
social system (Boella et al. 2007). Obligation can take a negated form, in which case it is referred to
as prohibition. In legal theory, a norm is any behavioral rule dictated by a ruling body and enforced
through the use of sanctions (Verhagen 2000). In sociology and the social sciences, norms are rules
of behavior or behavioral constraints that are socially enforced and considered valid by the majority
of the group (Bendor and Swistak 2001; Ehrlich and Levin 2005; Horne 2001; Therborn 2002; Young
2008)—though the quantitative meaning of majority is never strictly deﬁned and varies in accordance
to the context. Decision theory, game theory, and other theories based on rational actors treat norms
in a similar way; as successful behaviors that have been adopted by a majority of the population
(Bendor and Swistak 2001).
Regardless of the speciﬁc domain, there is a common theme in which norms are treated as
behaviors which ought to be displayed by members of a group when in a given context (Boella et al.
2007; Horne 2001); this implies that the observed behavior does not always match the expected
normative behavior. When the observed behavior of an agent does not match the expected behavior
then the acting agent is said to be deviant. That is to say, an agent is deviant when it does not abide
by the generally accepted rules for behavior (the norm) for the context in which it is acting. Deviant
agents can be lone actors, or part of a larger deviant subculture. One can even think of deviance as
an emergent property that results from the failure of two groups to come to terms on accepted
behaviors. In this perspective, deviance is not necessarily bad, and can be just as important as norm
obedience to a healthy society. For instance, deviance provides a source of alternative behavioral
rules that can be called upon at a later time. The topic of deviance is an important concept in
sociology and has far reaching implications to normative multi-agent systems (Meneguzzi and Luck
2009); however, a full treatment of deviance and its related theories lies outside the scope of this
paper. Normative systems attempt to minimize deviance through the use of social enforcements
such as sanctions. Sanctions are actions that levy punishment on deviant agents or reward
conforming agents. In many cases, sanctions are also norms. Norms about norms have been
termed meta-norms within the normative systems community (Axelrod 1986; Ehrlich and Levin
2005).
Speciﬁc to the literature on multi-agent systems, norms typically refer to: constraints on behavior
(Shoham and Tennenholtz 1992), solutions to a macro-level problem (Zhang and Leezer 2009),
obligations (Verhagen 2000); and regulatory or control devices for decentralized systems
(Savarimuthu et al. 2008). One aspect of norms that is frequently left unaddressed in artiﬁcial
systems is their dynamic nature and tendency to change over time (Neumann 2008). An examination
of human society yields clear examples of this phenomenon. The norms of one generation are rarely
identical to the next.
Key Normative Concepts
The various deﬁnitions and treatments of norms can be distilled down to a small set of
straightforward concepts:
A norm is any behavioral rule that is considered valid by the majority of a population—where
the quantitative deﬁnition of majority is problem dependent. The precise size and composition
of a population is also problem dependent. It is not unusual to divide a large population into
multiple sub-populations such that the original norm is considered invalid by one or more of the
new collectives. The sub-populations may in turn have their own norms that did not exist in the
uniﬁed population.
Norms are acquired through a social learning process where an agent interacts with other
agents as well as its environment. In sociology, this process is known as socialization; in
anthropology it is called enculturation.
Norms are socially enforced through external sanctions or other measures until they become
internalized by an agent. Once internalized, norms are enforced primarily through internal
mechanisms.
Norms spread. The ability for norms to spread is a consequence of the system's underlying
network topology in conjunction with active and passive transmission mechanisms.
With these concepts, we are able to discuss norms at the individual level. If an agent associates a
speciﬁc set of behavioral rules with a particular context, we call that set of rules and their associated
context a potential norm. When we consider a speciﬁc agent in isolation, potential norms are norms
in the traditional macro-level sense. However, when we consider a speciﬁc agent in the context of a
larger population, potential norms act as micro-level forces that produce macro-level social
phenomenon. Potential norms spread through a population via social learning processes and
enforcements until adopted by a sufﬁcient proportion of the population, at which time we refer to them
as societal norms (or simply norms) and once again treat them in the traditional macro-level sense of
the term. By introducing the idea of potential norms, we are able to examine normative processes in








Potential Sub-optimality and Normative Choice
Potential sub-optimality and normative choice are two distinct characteristics that make norms
particularly interesting in the context of agent-based problem solving when the agents under
consideration are rational agents.
Potential sub-optimality is associated with norms that solve macro-level problems. It refers to the
idea that while a normative solution can be acceptable, it may not be optimal (or even Pareto
optimal.) A norm can exhibit potential sub-optimality if the problem does not require an optimal
solution (Henrich et al. 2008), if multiple solutions exist for the problem and all are acceptable
(Bendor and Swistak 2001), or if the cost of obtaining an optimal solution for the problem is too high
(Boella et al. 2007). One consequence of the potential sub-optimality property is that it may be
possible to ﬁnd a normative solution quicker than an optimal solution. This can be used to deﬁne an
evolutionary process where an acceptable solution is quickly found and implemented and then
improved upon as the system continues to operate, eventually converging to an optimal solution over
time.
Normative choice refers to the ability of an agent to willfully violate a norm and assume the role of
deviant. The agent is able to make a choice as to whether or not it will obey a norm. Unlike the
situation in many multi-agent systems where the violation of rules is neither permitted by design nor
expected, the violation of norms is a common occurrence that can guide a normative system
towards a better solution (this idea is at the center of theories on social change) (Boella et al. 2007;
Dignum 1999). In order to support normative choice, normative agents must be able to recognize and
reason about norms. This enables the agents to make intelligent decisions about the acceptance or
rejection of a norm and detect when other agents obey or violate norms so as to respond
appropriately.
Any system attempting to make use of norms with a high degree of ﬁdelity must account for both
potential sub-optimality and normative choice.
Norms in the Social Science and Engineering
Throughout the years researchers have conceived of numerous typologies, categorizations, and
specialized deﬁnitions of norms that can often make it difﬁcult to determine which one to use when
approaching a problem. Because the application of norms to solve real world problems depends on
the context, broad categorizations can be immediately useful for ﬁnding related literature and
understanding how others have approached similar problems. Towards this end, and to serve as a
continuation of our discussion on the nature of norms, we brieﬂy discuss norms from the perspective
of the social sciences and engineering.
Norms in the Social Sciences
In the primary social sciences (psychology, sociology, and economics) and philosophy, the research
and interest on norms has shifted throughout the years between the social function of norms
(inspired by sociologists like Durkheim, Parsons, and Merton), the social impact of norms (inspired
by economics), and the mechanisms leading to the emergence and creation of norms (inspired in
part by complexity science).
In the context of social function, norms are often concerned with the oughtness and expectation of
agent behavior; where oughtness refers to the notion that there are behaviors an agent should (or
should not) perform regardless of the possible consequences and expectation refers to the
behaviors other agents anticipate when observing an agent. Expectation is created when an agent
displays behavioral regularity each time it encounters a speciﬁc context (Hechter and Opp 2001a). In
the literature relating to the social function of norms, we ﬁnd norms that address individual action in
isolation, norms that govern interaction between members of a group, and norms that dictate
responses to behaviors observed in others (Gibbs 1965; Horne 2001). Norms are also seen to
provide social function in terms of obligations; be they legal, moral, or conditional. Aside from referring
to behaviors that agents ought to do, or are expected to do, norms have functionality in regards to
telling us what something is (deﬁnition) and telling us what is "normal" in a population (distribution)
(Boella and Torre 2006; Duangsuwan and Liu 2009; Therborn 2002).
In the context of social impact, norms are considered terms of cost provided to or imposed on the
parties involved in a social interaction. Under this context, cost is associated with the amount of
resources that are gained or lost during an interaction. These resources can be internal, such as
emotion levels, energy, etc, or external in the case of food, money, etc. The social impact perspective
identiﬁes norms that beneﬁt the agent and society and incur a cost to both, norms that beneﬁt








both individuals and society without cost (Horne 2001; Savarimuthu et al. 2008).
Finally, and more recently, there has been a growing interest in norms from the context of norm
emergence and creation (norm origin). This type of research is concerned with the "how" of norms
more than the "why." In particular, the literature identiﬁes two general methods by which norms can
come into existence (Boella and Torre 2006; Boella et al. 2008b; Tuomela 1995; Verhagen 2000). The
ﬁrst explanation of norm origin is that they are explicitly created (as potential norms) and enforced by
an authority structure to regulate and order interactions with a society. The second explanation is that
norms emerge from regularities in behavior when agents interact with one another and mutual belief
that the behavior is correct with regards to the goals of the agents. We will call norms that originate
from an authority structure Type I norms, and norms that emerge from the interaction of agents Type
II norms. Both types of norms have implications in the control, organization, and structure of agent
societies.
Norms in Engineering (and Computational Science)
An engineering perspective typically places importance on the application of norms to engineering
processes, usually as a form of regulation and control within a system. In this way, norms are viewed
as another tool (in the same vein as contracts, protocols, etc) to accomplish some speciﬁc task.
In normative multi-agent systems, the focus is typically on rules of action that can be used to
constrain an agent's behavior and thus reduce the size of its search space. These constraints can
either be rigid, in which case the norm must be obeyed and is viewed as a global constraint; or
ﬂexible, in which case the obedience of the norm is dependent on the agent making the decision (Wu
2008).
Representation of Norms in Agent-Based Systems
In order for norms to be used in agent-based systems, norms must be speciﬁed in a way that
enables them to be processed by artiﬁcial agents. Research in this area is still in its infancy due to a
limited focus on the practical application of normative agents, but progress is being made
nonetheless. We brieﬂy describe four major representation schemes used in recent research: modal
logic, condition/action pairs in rule-based systems, binary strings, and game theory.
Modal logic is an extension of classical formal logic that reasons about the necessary and the
possible. Deontic logic is a derivative of modal logic that reasons about obligations, permissions, and
prohibitions (Meyer and Wieringa 1993; Wright 1951). Deontic logic is tightly coupled with the
normative systems from legal theory, and as a result it has become a popular representation scheme
within the normative agent community. In the existing literature, deontic logic, other variations of
modal logic, and ﬁrst-order logic, have been used to develop normative agent architectures (Boella
and Torre 2006; Castelfranchi et al. 1999), extend existing agent models (Alberti et al. 2005;
Meneguzzi and Luck 2009; Sadri et al. 2005), and specify illegal behavior and its consequences
(Meyer and Wieringa 1993).
Rule-based systems are collections of condition/action pairs together with an inference engine and a
working memory. In normative systems, it is common to ﬁnd that the condition/action pairs encode
normative behaviors and their associated contexts (Boella et al. 2007). This representation format is
commonly used by systems that take advantage of ofﬂine design, where the norms are coded
directly into the agent's decision making system (Castelfranchi et al. 1998; Conte and Castelfranchi
1995; Hales 2002; Saam and Harrier 1999; Savarimuthu and Craneﬁeld 2009; Schelling 1978;
Shoham and Tennenholtz 1992; Staller and Petta 2001; Younger 2004).
Binary strings are sequences of ones and zeros, where each digit represents the presence (in the
case of a one) or absence (in the case of a zero) of a norm. This scheme enables norms to be dealt
with on an abstract level, and it is often used in research that examines the transmission and
emergence of norms in a population (Caldas and Coelho 1999; Epstein 2001; Flentge et al. 2001a;
Galan and Izquierdo 2005; Nakamarua and Levin 2004).
In normative multi-agent systems based on game theory, each agent is capable of making a simple
choice that yields a corresponding payoff. At each round of the game, the agents attempt to
maximize their payoff by choosing an action based on what they anticipate their opponent to choose.
Norms are represented by the strategies that an agent uses to make these decisions (Mukherjee et
al. 2007; Savarimuthu et al. 2008). A norm emerges when the number of agents in the population
playing by the same strategy exceeds some tolerance value. Like the condition/action pairs of rule-







On an abstract level, a normative system can be deﬁned as any system where norms and normative
concepts are required to accurately describe and specify the system's behavior (Meyer and
Wieringa 1993). Of the many types of normative systems that exist, we are concerned with one
particular type referred to as a normative multi-agent system.
A normative multi-agent system combines concepts of norms with an explicit representation scheme
for normative information in order to provide a solution to problems relating to openness in multi-agent
systems, where an open multi-agent system (Artikis and Pitt 2009) is a multi-agent system in which
agents may not share the same architecture or the same goals, interactions between agents cannot
be predicted in advance, and agents are able to join and leave the system freely. To accomplish this,
a normative multi-agent system is built from normative agents that must be able to create, modify,
detect, transmit, and reason about norms, as well as enforce existing norms through sanctions or
some other mechanism (Boella et al. 2007; Boella et al. 2008a; Boella et al. 2008b).
Research speciﬁc to normative multi-agent systems, both in relation to open multi-agent systems
and as entities in their own right, has grown in recent years. Partly responsible for, and emerging
from this growth, are the COIN workshops (http://www.pcs.usp.br/~coin/) that investigate
coordination, organization, institutions, and norms in agent systems; the Normative Multi-agent
Systems workshops at Dagstuhl (http://www.dagstuhl.de/09121) which cover a wide variety of topics
on normative multi-agent systems; the Emil Project (http://emil.istc.cnr.it/) that seeks to understand
norm innovation; and the COST Action OC0801 working group on Norms (http://www.agreement-
technologies.eu/wg2).
Normative Processes and the Norm Life Cycle
The published research on normative multi-agent systems contains a remarkable amount of
structure, similarity, and connectivity. This underlying organization enables us to create a process
oriented model of norm life cycle. In our model, we identify the following normative processes:
creation, transmission, recognition, enforcement, acceptance, modiﬁcation, internalization,
emergence, forgetting, and evolution. From these, we identify enforcement, internalization, and
emergence as three super-processes and evolution as an end-to-end process. The interaction and
relationship between these processes is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where each box represents a
normative process and the thin arrows represent the ﬂow of information between processes. The
larger arrows can be read as "consists of the following subprocesses."
Recent research involving norm taxonomies and typologies reinforces our decision to use a process
oriented approach and supports our claims that the existence of a norm life cycle is alluded to in the
literature on norms and normative multi-agent systems (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Savarimuthu
and Craneﬁeld 2009; Verhagen 2007). As a comparison to our model, Savarimuthu and Craneﬁeld
(2009) describe a norm life cycle in which norm creation, spreading, enforcement, and emergence
act as the primary stages. Each of these stages is supported by a set of relevant research
publications. Internalization is mentioned, but not emphasized. The evolutionary nature of norms as
described in our model is not mentioned, nor is importance of forgetting. There are, however, many
commonalities in our ﬁndings which we consider to be important since we developed our model prior
to knowledge of this particular paper. For example, the main ideas about how norms spread and
emerge are similar, as are our conclusions and interpretations of the shared references. It is partly on




Figure 1. Normative Processes
In the proposed norm life cycle, ideas that will become norms are created as part of an evolutionary
process. These new potential norms are then spread through active or passive transmission,
depending on the system organization and allocation of control. As neighboring agents are exposed
to the new norms, social enforcement ensures that those norms are acquired and internalized.
Internalization refers to the shift in preference from the agent's original set of norms to the newly
acquired norms. It also signals a shift in enforcement from external pressures to internal desires.
This chain of transmission, enforcement, and internalization is known as normative emergence. The
emergence sub-process continues until the potential norms are acquired, internalized, and
rebroadcast by a sufﬁciently large subpopulation; at which point the potential norm becomes an
actual norm (which we simply call a norm.) Eventually, conditions change and it becomes
unreasonable to obey a particular norm. Consensus with regard to the norm disappears and the
norm becomes invalid. When existing norms are no longer suited to the current conditions, they are
candidates to be forgotten and new norms are created through an evolutionary process that begins
the cycle anew.
Given our normative process model and its associated life cycle, we next describe in detail the major
processes of enforcement, internalization, emergence and evolution as illustrated in Figure 1. First
and foremost, however, we discuss transmission since it is an integral part of the normative process
as a whole.
Transmission
Transmission (not directly pictured in ﬁgure 1) is responsible for the spread of norms from one agent
to another. Over time, this process results in norms being diffused throughout an entire population. In
the literature, we identify three core components that make this possible: agent relationship,
transmission technique, and connectivity structure. Transmission (also called spreading) is a much
larger topic than we are able to fully discuss here. It has applications in virtually every scientiﬁc ﬁeld,
from statistical mechanics to economics to biology to sociology, and is tightly connected to the ﬁeld
of networks. Audiences interested in knowing more about transmission in the general sense are
encouraged to read papers on percolation theory and diffusion (Stauffer and Aharony 1994), as well
as networks in general (Newman 2010).
Agent Relationship
There are three relationships between sender and receiver that dictate how norms spread: vertical,
horizontal, and oblique (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Ehrlich and Levin 2005). Vertical transmission
occurs in the presence of reproduction, when the relationship between sender and receiver is one of
parent and offspring. Social learning processes ensure that the offspring acquire some or all of their
parent's norms, resulting in the directed transmission of norms from one generation to another
(Younger 2004). Horizontal transmission takes place when norms are transmitted between peers of
the same generation (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich et al. 2008). This process results in norms







neighbors. Horizontal transmission has the potential to increase the diversity of an agent's behavior
during the agent's own lifetime. The ﬁnal transmission pattern we mention, oblique transmission,
occurs when norms are transmitted from an authority ﬁgure to a set of subordinates. This process
can result in norms spreading both vertically and horizontally. Oblique transmission is the approach
used by centralized multi-agent systems and normative systems that concerned with Type I norms
(Hoffmann 2005).
In normative simulations and systems that attempt to model real world phenomena, transmission
patterns are not restricted to a single relationship. In models of human society, horizontal and vertical
transmission occurs at the same time, with entities learning from their peers as well as their parents
(Flentge et al. 2001a). The degree to which one relationship inﬂuences norm adoption over another is
still under investigation within the social sciences.
Transmission Techniques
We identify two transmission techniques from the literature: active transmission and passive
transmission. Active transmission is similar to the idea of push techniques in event-driven
programming, and passive transmission is similar to the idea of pull techniques in event-driven
programming.
Active transmission occurs when one agent purposefully broadcasts a set of norms to neighboring
agents. Active transmission is typically accompanied by social enforcements in the form of sanctions
that are intended to persuade neighbors to adopt the behavior. At the time of this research, normative
multi-agent systems that use active transmission do not appear to be as common as those that use
passive transmission, though one example of active transmission can be found in the use of norm
entrepreneurs (Hoffmann 2005). It is our opinion that challenges associated with norm representation
are partly responsible for the lack of research in active transmission techniques.
Passive transmission, on the other hand, occurs when an agent observes one of its neighbors
performing some behavior. In passive transmission, the observer must infer the norms governing the
observed behavior. Because the justiﬁcation of a behavior is not explicitly given, it is possible for the
acquired norm to be different from the original norm due to bias, error, or some other factor (Henrich
et al. 2008). As with the process of active transmission, social enforcements are often used to
coerce one agent to acquire the behavior of another. However, in the case of passive transmission
these enforcements are often internal to the observer. The simplest approach to passive
transmission can be seen in normative multi-agent systems where agents copy the norms of their
more successful neighbors (Flentge et al. 2001b).
Connectivity Structure
The ﬁnal component of transmission that we discuss is the social connectivity structure between
agents (we simply call this the agent topology). This structure is often referred to as a social network
in sociology (Hechter and Opp 2001b) or more generally, a network (Newman 2010). Research in
this area of normative multi-agent systems has been primarily concerned with the effects of agent
topology on the emergence of norms. This has resulted in experiments that examine the performance
of systems where the agents are placed in 2-D lattices (Mukherjee et al. 2007; Younger 2004) and
complex networks (Nakamarua and Levin 2004), speciﬁcally scale-free and small world networks
(Zhang and Leezer 2009).
Simulations of normative multi-agent systems designed to investigate the effects of social network
structure on norm emergence suggest that the agent topology determines the number of agents that
cooperate with one another (as deﬁned by how many agents play (Cooperate, Cooperate) in a game
such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt) as well as the rate at which cooperation is achieved
(Zhang and Leezer 2009). These simulations also suggest that while the initial transmission patterns
vary depending on network, the asymptotic behavior of the networks is equivalent; except in the
case of a 1-D lattice structure (Nakamarua and Levin 2004). There is still some question as to the
applicability of these results to dynamic networks such as those found in open multi-agent systems.
Research on agent topology in normative multi-agent systems has also identiﬁed two important
properties that relate to the edge structure of the network; information sparseness and the interaction
sparseness (Bendor and Swistak 2001). When agents are connected in such a way that information
is sparse (agents only know what some of the other agents are doing, they are not omniscient) it
becomes harder to impose sanctions since deviant acts are not always observed by those with the
power to sanction. If, however, there is sparse interaction (there are some agents that cannot interact
with each other) then the potential for a norm to emerge is largely unaffected so long as the network
is dense in terms of information (every agent knows what every other agent has done). This result is




the effects of a network that possesses both sparse information and sparse interaction.
Enforcement
Figure 2. The Enforcement Processes
In the enforcement process (ﬁgure 2), one set of agents attempts to coerce another set of agents to
adopt and/or obey a set of norms. To accomplish this, agent behavior must ﬁrst be recognized and
classiﬁed as normative or deviant. If the observed behavior is deviant, then the associated agent is
negatively sanctioned (and potentially positively sanctioned if the behavior is normative.)
Enforcement can be externally directed, internally directed, or motivational (as in the case of
coordination motives) (Young 2008).
Norm Recognition
Norm recognition is one of the core challenges faced when building a normative multi-agent system
(Boella et al. 2008b; Conte and Dignum 2001). Norm recognition refers to the ability of an agent to
observe or interact with a group of agents and infer the correct norms of the agents in that group;
humans are often able to accomplish this through conversation (Henderson 2005). Norm recognition
is also concerned with the ability to detect deviant agents within a group. The detection of deviant
agents is critical to proper enforcement (Therborn 2002). Many of the normative systems used to
answer basic research questions use a very simple strategy to overcome the challenges of norm
recognition (Castelfranchi et al. 1998; Hales 2002). In these systems, there is often only a single
norm being used to investigate the questions of interest. The agents are divided into two groups, the
normative group and the deviant group. The norm is known by all agents in the normative group. An
agent is identiﬁed as part of the deviant group if it does not prescribe to the known norm. Information
about the group orientation of agents is identiﬁed through interaction between agents and then
communicated to other agents. Typically group orientation is only of concern to agents in the
normative group. This approach works for detecting deviant agents in simple systems where all of
the norms are known and violation has a direct and immediate impact, but it may not scale to more
complex systems where multiple norms exist throughout multiple groups. Research into alternative
techniques for norm recognition is required and starting to be pursued as part of the EMIL project
(http://emil.istc.cnr.it/) (Andrighetto et al. 2007; Campenni et al. 2009) and the COST Action OC0801
working group on Norms (http://www.agreement-technologies.eu/wg2 ).
Sanctions
The coercive acts used in social enforcement are known throughout the literature as sanctions. A
sanction can be a punishment for disobeying a norm or a reward for obeying it; though the common
use is in the sense of punishment and the imposition of penalties for deviance. In general, sanctions
are issued by either the deviant agent guilty of the violation, a neighboring agent that observes the
violation, or an authority structure made aware of the violation. The act of sanctioning is often
associated with a cost that must be paid by the sanctioning agent. This cost can be complex and
take the form of relationship damage such as a loss of trust or friendship (Horne 2001), or it can be
straight forward and result in the loss of some utility value in the case of rational agents. In
computational systems, if the cost to sanction is too high, agents will not impose the sanctions and
the desired behaviors will never be enforced and never stabilized in the system. Similarly, if the effect
of the sanction is too small, agents will not have enough incentive to behave in the desired manner,
and thus the desired behavior will never stabilize in the system (Axelrod 1986; Savarimuthu et al.
2008). If behavior fails to stabilize, then a norm will not emerge.
All of the research reviewed for this paper examines at most only two groups interacting with each
other at the same time. While this approach is important to establish the fundamental ideas for
modeling sanctions, it results in a limited view of social interaction in which one set of agents is
normative and the other set is deviant. To fully appreciate the potential that normative multi-agent
systems offer to solving practical problems and accurately modeling social interaction, there must be
an investigation into the dynamics that arise when three or more groups, each with conﬂicting norms,






Enforcement can be externally directed, internally directed, or motivational (as in the case of
coordination motives) (Young 2008). Initially, enforcement is used during the transmission process to
create an incentive for agents to adopt a new set of norms. After transmission, enforcement is used
to ensure that agents continue to obey the acquired norms (Therborn 2002) until they are eventually
internalized and external enforcement is no longer required. Once internalized, norms are enforced
internally through intrinsic motivations (Epstein 2001).
Externally Directed Enforcement External enforcement occurs when one agent observes another
agent violating a norm (Flentge et al. 2001a; Galan and Izquierdo 2005; Savarimuthu et al. 2008) or
during norm transmission when one agent refuses to adopt the norms of another. In response, the
observing agent or an associated authority structure sanctions the offender. In artiﬁcial systems,
sanctions are typically realized through a reduction in some type of problem dependant resource.
The reduction is intended to be detrimental to the agent's ability to achieve its goal. In systems that
use vertical transmission (Flentge et al. 2001a), externally imposed sanctions are sometimes used to
reduce the chance that a given agent will mate; and thus his deviant behavior will not be passed on
to the next generation, thereby reducing the overall level of deviance in the population (Caldas and
Coelho 1999).
An alternative to direct resource reduction as a form of external enforcement is through the use of
reputation (Axelrod 1986; Castelfranchi et al. 1998; Hales 2002; Younger 2004). In reputation-based
enforcement systems, each agent maintains a list of other agents in the system—either agents that it
has personally met, or agents that it has learned of from communication with other agents. Each
agent in the list has a reputation value associated with it. If the reputation value is less than some
tolerance value, the agent maintaining the list will either sanction the associated agent or refuse to
interact with it. Research into the effects of reputation suggests that it can improve the stability of a
norm, especially when agents are able to communicate with others and share their reputation lists
(Hales 2002; Younger 2004). The use of stereotyping has also been investigated, with results
showing that while it is effective in establishing reputation, it only works when the group being
stereotyped is homogeneous (Hales 2002). In the past, reputation has been measured as a binary
value, but it has been suggested that using an interval measurement can result in increased
performance and the capability for forgiveness among agents in the system (Younger 2004).
Forgiveness, however, has not yet been experimentally examined. We purpose that the true power of
forgiveness emerges when agents are able to acquire new norms on-line through oblique or
horizontal transmission. To our knowledge, this process has not yet been implemented in a real
system.
Internally Directed Enforcement In contrast to external enforcement, whereby a deviant agent is
sanctioned by a third party, internal enforcement occurs when an agent sanctions itself for
disobeying a norm. This type of enforcement is typically the case once an agent has internalized a
norm. Emotions are thought to be one critically important factor in motivating internal enforcement
(Scheve et al. 2005; Staller and Petta 2001), but in practice the sanction for deviance is typically
encoded as part of the cost for executing an action in the presence of a norm. This behavior is
particularly widespread in normative systems where the agents are considered rational. In these
systems, sanctions are implicitly speciﬁed during the construction of the payoff functions (Axelrod
1986; Mukherjee et al. 2007; Savarimuthu et al. 2008). Research on more realistic mechanisms for
internal enforcement such as the use of emotion, morality, and personal goals are still in their infancy
when compared to the state of the art in external enforcement.
Motivational Enforcement Motivational enforcement (in particular, coordination motives) is a type of
social enforcement resulting from "common sense" in a system of rational agents. If a particular norm
is expected by all agents in the system, then there is no beneﬁt for an agent to violate it; thus the only
rational choice for the agent is to obey the norm. There is no need for an explicit sanction since any
deviant choice would lead to suboptimal behavior and all the agents are rational (thus the agents
would not choose the deviant action when the other yields a higher reward.) This method of
enforcement is often seen in problems centered on cooperation and coordination where only one
choice is the "correct" choice (Young 2008). As a concrete example, consider an autonomous car
that needs to drive on a highway—it can drive on the left side of the road or the right, but there is only
one correct choice—the social norm of the system. If the control system attempts to deviate from the
established norm it will suffer severe physical damage and fail at its task.
Internalization





Internalization (which can be viewed as a type of immergence (Conte et al. 2007; Andrighetto and
Conte 2009)) is the process (ﬁgure 3) in which agents acquire and integrate new information into
their cognitive structure (Verhagen 2001). Initially, an agent becomes aware of a norm through the
transmission process. Social enforcements result in pressure on the agent to adopt and obey the
new norm over any existing desires. To handle these pressures, an agent invokes a conﬂict
resolution process (acceptance) that results in the acceptance or rejection of the transmitted norm. If
the agent decides to accept the norm, there is a chance that the information is modiﬁed during the
transcription process (modiﬁcation), when the agent is integrating the norm into its own knowledge
base—this may be due to bias, error, or some other unforeseen scenario. Once the norm has been
acquired, social enforcements continue to exert pressure against internal desires and motivations
and ensure that the agent continues to obey the norm. Over time, the norm is integrated into the
desires of the agent and priority shifts from the original norms possessed by the agent to the newly
acquired norm (internalization). Deﬁned in a more concise form, internalization can be seen as the
measure of commitment an agent feels to the execution of new norms (Campbell 1964). In humans,
theories such as Self-Determinism Theory (Deci and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Deci 2000) attempt to
explain how internalization may occur and identify key components, such as motivation and need,
which appear to be critical in the internalization process. It is essential to understand these theories if
the goal of a normative system is to accurately model human behavior. However, the details of Self-
Determinism Theory and other psychological and sociological theories of motivation (see Deci and
Ryan (2000) for a summary) are outside the scope of this current paper.
Norm Acceptance and Modiﬁcation
Norm acceptance and modiﬁcation are precursors to the actual act of internalization and integration
of information into the agent's deep cognitive structures. Before a norm can be internalized, it must
ﬁrst be accepted by an agent. Norm acceptance is a conﬂict resolution process in which external
social enforcements compete against the internal desires and motivations of the agent. If the new
norm is in conﬂict with existing norms and may lead to inconsistent behaviors, or if the cost of
accepting the new norm is too high, it will be rejected (Meneguzzi and Luck 2009). However, it is
feasible that there are circumstances where it is desirable for an agent to accept conﬂicting norms,
especially if an agent is able to forget existing norms.
Once an agent has made the decision to accept a norm, it must then undergo a process of
transcription in which the norm is added to the agent's knowledge base. During this phase, it is
possible that the norm might undergo modiﬁcations due to bias, inferential errors, or some other
unforeseen scenario (e.g. perhaps there is a chance for mutation). These modiﬁcations can be seen
as a side effect of possessing incomplete information due to autonomous operation; the results are
akin to human misunderstanding.
Once a norm has been accepted and integrated into an agent, it is then reinforced through
techniques such as social monitoring (Conte and Dignum 2001) to ensure it is in compliance with the
rest of the system. Failure to properly obey a norm may result in sanctions that force the agent to re-
evaluate its behavior and potentially attempt to reacquire one or more norms. This reinforcement
process continues even after a norm has been internalized.
Methods of Internalization
The actual mechanisms used in human norm internalization are still unknown. This leaves designers
of normative systems free to explore their own solutions, though in general internalization methods
for normative agents do not appear to be a popular topic of research and internalization itself is
seldom considered in the normative systems literature (Meneguzzi and Luck 2009), although multiple
authors have cited the need for investigation (Axelrod 1986; Neumann 2008; Saam and Harrier 1999)
and the topic is starting to achieve more recognition (Andrighetto and Conte 2009). In the existing
literature, norms are typically internalized as soon as they are acquired, without any sort of
modiﬁcation. This is most obvious when the norms are designed ofﬂine, but also applies to systems
that allow norms to spread between agents. Precious few alternatives to this approach have been
tried. In one system developed by Verhagen (2001), agents maintain a decision model for
themselves and the group to which they belong. Internalization is then measured by the degree of
similarity the two models have to one another, and a norm is said to be internalized when the self-
model matches the group model. Another approach is to measure internalization as a function of the
neighborhood size an agent observes when considering social retaliation for violating a norm. In this
method, a norm is said to be internalized when the agent is no longer concerned with external
pressures and only internal desires are used to decide if the agent will obey or violate a norm
(Epstein 2001). The Belief-Obligations-Intentions-Desires (BOID) agent architecture (Broersen et al.
2002; Neumann 2010) offers hope for future investigations into norm internalization. It speciﬁcally
identiﬁes internalization and enables it by separating group norms from traditional BDI agent





behaviors based on autonomy values that represent the priority of an agent's own desires versus the
desires of the group.
Emergence
Figure 4. The Emergence Process
When speaking of norms and agent-based systems, the term emergence is used to describe two
phenomena. The ﬁrst use of emergence is to describe norm creation on a micro scale; the second
use refers to norm establishment on a macro scale. We use emergence in the latter sense and say
that a norm has emerged when it has been acquired by a sufﬁcient number of agents in a population.
Thus emergence is the process under which potential norms transform into societal norms. This
process is also referred to as evolutionary norm emergence (Flentge et al. 2001a). In terms of the
process model presented in ﬁgure 1, normative emergence (ﬁgure 4) is the result of interactions
between transmission, enforcement, and internalization.
Research on norm emergence within the normative multi-agent system literature has centered
around three main areas. The ﬁrst area of research deals with investigating into the use of game
theory to explain the dynamics of norm emergence. The second area examines the relationship
between sanctions and norm emergence. The third area attempts to understand the impact of
transmission on norm emergence.
Game Theoretical Analysis
The popularity of research on norm emergence is due in part to research on the emergence of
cooperation and coordination in multi-agent systems (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). Cooperation and
coordination are often approached from a game theory perspective. A population of agents plays a
game where each action has an associated payoff. The selection of actions is guided by the agent's
strategy, which can be viewed as a potential norm. Typically (in the case of rational agents), the
agent attempts to maximize its payoff in every round. In evolutionary game theory (Bendor and
Swistak 2001), the agents are able to adapt their strategies through progressive rounds in an attempt
to achieve higher payoffs during iterated games. Cooperation or coordination is said to emerge in a
system once a sufﬁcient number of agents all play the same strategy (now a societal norm) or
interact in such a way that the system reaches a steady state. Game theory is used to study norms
other than cooperation or coordination in the same manner. Norms are said to emerge once a
sufﬁcient proportion of the population settles on the same set of behaviors. One way to measure the
degree of emergence is to monitor the average payoff of the population and observe when it exceeds
a speciﬁc tolerance value. Norms are stable once they have emerged and the number of agents
obeying the norms does not decrease below the tolerance value (Axelrod 1986; Mukherjee et al.
2007; Zhang and Leezer 2009).
Effects of Enforcement on Emergence
Recent research centered on norm emergence builds on ideas from evolutionary game theory and
incorporates cognitive models, learning mechanisms and speciﬁc connectivity structures. In
particular, the use of cognitive models and agent architectures such as the BDI model allows
researchers to examine the role of enforcement and social learning in norm emergence.
The results from research on the relationship between sanctions and emergence (Axelrod 1986;
Flentge et al. 2001a; Galan and Izquierdo 2005) suggest that the cost of a sanction, both to the
enforcer and deviant, is key to its usefulness as a control element; but the dynamic nature of social
interaction makes it hard to generalize results obtained from static environments. Sanctions in and of
themselves do not appear to be enough to cause the emergence of norms. The degree of
punishment or reward due to a sanction must also be taken into account, and it must change with the
degree of emergence to ensure that deviant agents want to acquire the norms and normative agents
want to continue obeying them. If the cost to sanction is too high, or the effect of the sanction is not





Effects of Transmission on Norm Emergence
More recently, the effects of agent connectivity and the underlying social networks of normative multi-
agent systems has been a growing topic of study. Research on the relationship between agent
topology and norm emergence has shown that in asymptotic time, the underlying network topology
contributes minimal difference to the emergence of norms if it is static. Additionally, it is shown that
when agents acquire norms through a social learning processes based on the composition of their
neighbors, one norm tends to become dominate the group; however when each agent learns
individually and selects a norm to follow in an independent fashion, multiple norms are able to co-
exist within the same group (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Boyd and Richerson 2005; Nakamarua and
Levin 2004). The precise relationship between the number of social and individual learning agents
required to produce multiple norms in a heterogeneous population is still unknown. In the case of
dynamic networks, research has shown that by using speciﬁc learning heuristics, norms can
emerge in a system of selﬁsh agents that attempt to maximize their own utility (Zhang and Leezer
2009). Further research is required to discover additional factors responsible for the emergence and
stability of norms in both human and artiﬁcial populations.
Evolution
Figure 5. The Evolution Process
Normative evolution (ﬁgure 5) is an end-to-end process that fully encompasses the norm life cycle. It
is an emergent phenomenon arising from the interaction of norm creation, norm emergence, norm
adaptation, and norm removal. However, in the literature on normative multi-agent systems, evolution
is often treated as a synonym of emergence with the majority of work focused on how a norm
spreads throughout a population. To oppose this perspective, we focus on the processes of norm
creation, norm adaptation, and norm removal so as to illustrate that while the evolutionary process
contains elements of norm emergence, it is a much broader concept.
Norm Creation
Norm creation (or innovation) is the process by which new norms are introduced into a normative
system. Current research in this area is inspired by methods of innovation within natural systems,
but when applied to artiﬁcial systems these approaches can be generalized. Our current
understanding of norm creation is restrained by our lack of knowledge in the areas of innovation,
imagination, and creativity.
There are three methods that lead to the creation of norms in the natural world (Boella et al. 2007;
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Lopez et al. 2005; Savarimuthu and Craneﬁeld 2009): spontaneous
emergence from social interaction, decree by an agent in power, and negotiation by agents within a
group. However, research on norm creation is typically conducted at the macro-level and aimed at
investigating the relationship between social and individual learning strategies, typically using
imitation and innovation, and their effect on the dynamics of emergence (Boyd and Richerson 2002;
Boyd and Richerson 2005; Nakamarua and Levin 2004). Results from this type of experiment
suggests that both learning components are needed in normative systems, but an optimal
combination has not been discovered and is more than likely context dependent. More recently, the
idea of social enhancement has been proposed as a mechanism for norm creation (Franz and
Matthews 2010). In this approach, agents do not imitate their neighbors; instead they observe the
objects involved in nearby interactions and play with them. Reinforcement learning is then used to
guide the agents towards the correct use of the objects. Social enhancement is weakly connected to
the idea of combining imitation with reinforcement learning to allow further exploration of a learned
concept.
From the literature speciﬁc to normative multi-agent systems, we identify two general methods of
norm creation in artiﬁcial agents: ofﬂine design and autonomous innovation, where ofﬂine design is
by far the most common approach to norm creation (Savarimuthu and Craneﬁeld 2009). In ofﬂine
design, system designers specify what norms a system will follow and encode them directly into the
agents. If the system requires new norms, they must be inserted by the designers. This approach







capture the intricacies and minutiae required for realistic performance. In contrast to ofﬂine design,
autonomous innovation requires the agents of a system to create new norms without external
interference. In order for this to occur, the researchers must address the challenges of ideation ("how
an idea for a behavior that becomes a norm gets invented in the ﬁrst place") and ﬁltering ("which
ideas are accepted and which are rejected") (Ehrlich and Levin 2005).
Current efforts to investigate autonomous innovation and address the challenges of ideation and
ﬁltering in artiﬁcial systems have been focused on machine learning and game theory (Bendor and
Swistak 2001; Mukherjee et al. 2007; Savarimuthu et al. 2008; Savarimuthu and Craneﬁeld 2009). In
game theoretical approaches, ideation is often reduced to ofﬂine design and ﬁltering to the selection
of the most successful behavior. Machine learning approaches handle ideation through search, but
take the same selection-based approach as game theory. The EMIL project (Andrighetto et al. 2007;
Campenni et al. 2009) proposes to create alternative innovation methods based on cognitive
architectures and further research into norm creation by creating a simulator that will allow
exploration and experimentation on norm innovation theories.
Norm Adaptation
Norm adaptation refers to the process by which the norms of a system change over time. In theory,
this is accomplished through the use of social learning processes such as imitation and socialization.
Once a new norm is created, it has the potential to emerge. If it successfully emerges, it either
competes against or replaces the existing norms that are internalized within the same context. Norm
adaptation can be illustrated with the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by dividing agents into one or more
groups and assigning an IPD strategy such as Grim Trigger, Tit for Tat, or Tit for Two Tats to each
agent (Bendor and Swistak 2001). The agents play against one another until one strategy appears to
be stable. Then, a different strategy can be introduced into the stable system and play resumed. By
introducing a new strategy into a stable system, it is possible to test the ability for the new strategy to
penetrate the society and establish itself as dominant. If the new strategy is able to stabilize, then it
can be claimed that the norms of the system have adapted to take advantage of new information.
This is adaptation at the macro level.
Alternatively, a norm can be modiﬁed when it is acquired by an agent. During the transmission phase,
bias from the receiving agent can result in subtle changes. This is mainly a concern in systems
where the norm cannot be copied over directly—in artiﬁcial systems this would require an ingenious
method of implementation that we have not found in the existing literature. A question of practicality
and usefulness also arises when this notion is applied to artiﬁcial systems. Modiﬁcations that occur
during transmission and internalization are adaptations at the micro-level.
Norm Removal
Norms that are replaced as a result of norm modiﬁcation may or may not be forgotten. The ability to
forget a norm (removal) is conceptually important when a system becomes complex or is limited in
resources. We have not found any speciﬁc research on the performance effects of norm removal,
but the process is often implicit in many systems that implement norm modiﬁcation (Bendor and
Swistak 2001; Mukherjee et al. 2007). More recently the larger question of norm adaption, of which
removal is essential, is beginning to receive more attention by researchers (Lopez-Sanchez et al.
2009). As more academics become interested in this topic, we have no doubt that all the components
of the norm evolution process with be examined.
Applications of Normative Multi-agent Systems
The research on and related to normative multi-agent systems contains a growing amount work on
the application of social norms to computational systems. This body of applied work currently
centers around two main areas: the role of norms in society and social simulation; and the use of
normative concepts to improve cooperation, coordination and control in engineered multi-agent
systems.
The Role of Norms in Society
The use of multi-agent simulation to investigate social phenomenon is not new, and a survey of the
complete domain is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on four common themes that
appear in the work speciﬁc to normative multi-agent systems: social control, benevolence,
reciprocity, and institutions.




domains in normative multi-agent systems. In one of the earliest experiments (Conte and
Castelfranchi 1995), a "ﬁnders-keepers" norm is used to try and reduce aggression (the number of
attacks in a simulated run) and increase social equality (how evenly resources are distributed) within
a population of foraging agents. To experiment with the ﬁnders-keepers norm, a simulated world was
constructed on a 2-D lattice with resource nodes placed randomly on a subset of the available cells.
At each time step, agents move through the environment in search of resources. At the start of the
simulation every agent is assigned ownership over one or more nodes, and every agent knows who
owns every node. When an agent encounters a resource, its behavior depends on the strategy it is
following. The simulation allows agents to be blind (they harvest or attack any agent that is on the
resource node), strategic (they harvest or attack any agent on a resource node as long as that agent
is weaker), or normative (they will only harvest nodes they own). The results from this simulation
show that when all agents are normative the aggression of the population dramatically decreases
and the overall equality of agents increases when compared to the other strategies. The original
research has since been extended (Castelfranchi et al. 1998) to investigate the effects of a binary
reputation value on aggression control and inequality in artiﬁcial societies. Other extensions
investigate the use of stereotypes with reputation to control aggression and social inequality (Hales
2002; Younger 2004). In the more recent simulations, reputation is measured on an interval instead of
being binary. It is shown by these experiments that reputation is a powerful tool for social
enforcement, with interval reputation allowing smoother control and the ability to easily forgive agents
over time. Stereotypes can also play a powerful role in classifying deviant agents, but care has to be
taken not too over-ﬁt the population and the impact is most beneﬁcial when all groups are
homogeneous. A combination of stereotypes and interval reputation may provide an even more
powerful mechanism of control, allowing one agent in a group to serve as a warning to others.
The effects of private property, heritage and power have also been investigated for their effects on
aggression and social inequality (Saam and Harrier 1999). Results from these investigations suggest
that under certain social conditions, the ﬁnders-keepers norm can lead to an increase in inequality;
but the more important result is the observation that power appears to play an integral role in
normative transmission and enforcement, and requires more in depth study. The ﬁnders-keepers
environment has also been used to study the effect of emotion on normative compliance (Staller and
Petta 2001). By adding an emotional component to normative agents, they are able to deviate from
the ﬁnders-keepers norm when the agent's desire to feed outweighs its desire to comply. The results
of experiments on emotion in normative agents reinforce the idea that norms bring order and overall
well-being to a population. The true potential of emotions lies in their ability to act as internal
sanctioning mechanisms.
Research into the social function of norms has also lead to investigations of benevolence norms.
There is not a fully agreed upon deﬁnition of benevolence, but one attempt at a deﬁnition of
compromise (Mohamed and Huhns 2001) states that an agent is benevolent if it voluntarily helps
other agents, acts towards the beneﬁt of society, does not expect an immediate reward for its
actions, and does not let benevolent actions stop it from attaining its own personal goals. Benevolent
agents (agents implementing the benevolence norm) are rational because they act without being
asked and will not act in a benevolent way if it prevents their personal goals from being accomplished
(Mohamed and Huhns 2001). To measure the functionality of benevolence, the "Mattress in the
Road" simulation was developed. In this simulation, agents drive along a road and occasionally drop
an object that slows down trafﬁc. The agents are divided into two groups, those following a
benevolence norm and those who do not. Benevolent agents take the time to remove the object,
paying a cost to do so, while non-benevolent agents pay a smaller cost to avoid it. When an agent
enters the road, it is assigned a random time limit in which it must get to the other side, if an agent
uses more than its allotted time it increases the chance that other agents will be late. The overall
ﬁtness of the society is rated in terms of the average time taken to drive down the road. Through
repeated runs of the simulation, it is shown that the beneﬁts of benevolent behavior depend on the
context. Under the deﬁnition of rational benevolent agents (agents subscribing to the compromised
deﬁnition of benevolence), benevolent agents are at worst equal to non-benevolent agents and often
result in better performance for the entire society.
Reciprocity (the idea that an agent responds to an action with a similar action, often represented by
the concept of sharing) is another area in which normative multi-agent systems have been used to
try and understand the impact of a particular social norm. Research in this domain suggests that
reciprocity can result in agents being obligated to one another, and thus increasing the level of
cooperation when compared to agents that do not reciprocate (Younger 2004). The idea of reciprocity
is in linked to trust, another area that has begun to see more interest by the normative multi-agent
systems community within recent years. However, a discussion of trust and its role in normative
systems is beyond the scope of this current paper.
The ﬁnal area of research involving norms at a social level that we mention in this paper is electronic
institutions. An electronic institution is an "agent environment that can regulate and direct the
interactions between agents" (Grossi et al. 2005) by providing a set of rules that dictate what agents
are permitted and forbidden to do under various circumstances (Bou et al. 2009). The core notions





structures, and normative rules (Artikis and Pitt 2009; Bou et al. 2009; Esteva et al. 2001). In an
electronic institution, institutional ontologies are often used to allow norms to be deﬁned at general
level and then redeﬁned at a speciﬁc level depending on context they are used in. These norms, and
their associated sanctions, can then be used to provide social control (Blake 2009). Institutions are
also used in BDI-inspired architectures to control agent behavior in open marketplace systems
(Hahn et al. 2005), systems that allow the formation of coalitions through social contracts (Sauro
2005), and as gate keepers to restrict interactions in artiﬁcial societies (Davidsson and Johansson
2005). At the forefront of research on electronic institutions are adaptive electronic institutions (Bou et
al. 2007; Bou et al. 2009) in which the institution itself is able to change its own regulations in
response to agent behavior so that the institutional goals can be accomplished in an open multi-agent
system. Electronic institutions are a growing research area with wide ranging implications for
normative and open multi-agent systems; however a full discussion of this topic is outside the scope
of this paper. A related area of research is multi-agent organizations, where one goal is to identify
how to structure the relationships between agents. Many multi-agent organizations also incorporate
normative ideas, traditionally as constraints on the behavior of agents within the system. A
discussion on multi-agent organizations is outside the scope of this paper, but interested readers are
encouraged to examine the Moise Organization Model ( http://moise.sourceforge.net/) by J. F.
Hubner, J. S. Sichman, and O. Boissier as a starting place. For a more general introduction to Multi-
Agent Organizations and their uses, a good starting point can be found in the work of Victor Lesser,
in particular Horling and Lesser (2005)
Application of Normative Concepts
In addition to simulating social phenomenon, research on normative multi-agent systems and norm-
inspired computing is also applied to the challenges faced when designing and implementing open
multi-agent systems, where an open multi-agent system is a multi-agent system in which agents may
not share the same architecture or the same goals, interactions between agents cannot be predicted
in advance, and agents are able to join and leave the system freely (Artikis and Pitt 2009). Related to
the implementation of open multi-agent systems, there is a large body of research devoted to
designing normative agent architectures and frameworks (Broersen et al. 2002; Castelfranchi et al.
1999; Dignum 1999; Lopez et al. 2005; Meneguzzi and Luck 2009; Neumann 2010), but a survey of
normative agent architectures is outside the scope of this current paper.
With regards to the challenge of designing an open multi-agent system, the primary role of normative
concepts has been to improve coordination, cooperation, and control among the agents (Carvalho et
al. 2005; Duangsuwan and Liu 2009; Kamara et al. 2005; Villata 2010; Wu 2008). A general method to
accomplish this involves foreign agents being able to recognize and acquire the local norms of the
system through direct or indirect interaction. Once the norms are acquired, the foreign agents are
able to interact with the local agents and assume task-related roles to provide additional resources
towards solving the current problem. Once the problem is solved, agents can remain in the local
system and take on a new task, or leave the system. Practical applications that incorporate this
method to one degree or another include norm-based Contract Net Protocol (Wu 2008), a norm-
based system for personal environmental control in modern buildings (Duangsuwan and Liu 2009),
an agent architecture that can enable ad-hoc networks to self-regulate and self-manage (Kamara et
al. 2005), a graph-based tool for metamodeling agent-based system requirements called NorMAS-
RE (Villata 2010), and a law enforcement architecture aimed at reducing risk and increasing the
dependability of software infrastructures (Carvalho et al. 2005).
Outside of a few speciﬁc social contexts and open multi-agent systems, the application domain for
normative multi-agent systems is still relatively unknown and not completely understood. As future
research begins to answer fundamental questions about the nature of norms and their role in society,
this will change. Over time, we predict that the application domain of normative multi-agent systems
will grow as their related problem space is deﬁned.
Future Research Directions
Signiﬁcant advancements have been made in regards to normative multi-agent systems over the
past twenty years, many of which directly contribute to our ability to create a process driven norm life
cycle. Though as evidenced by the gaps in our model, there are still many domains that require
further research before we can fully understand how to best model and make use of norms in
artiﬁcial systems.
Five levels of norm development have been proposed to classify for normative multi-agent systems
(Boella et al. 2008a):
1.  Norms are designed off-line and implicitly part of the agent's behavior
2.  Norms are explicitly represented in the agents
3.  Agents can add and remove norms according to some predeﬁned rules






4.  Agents are able to create and manage their own norms
5.  Agents are able to use norms to create a "moral reality"
Most existing normative systems belong in the ﬁrst two levels. In order to enable advancements in
future systems, the following areas have been suggested (Boella et al. 2008a) for further research:
norm representation, recognition, reasoning, deviance, institutions, and autonomy and internalization.
Based on our own research, we identify several additional areas that deserve further research: norm
creation, modiﬁcation, and removal; norm transmission and social learning; the application of social
networks analysis to normative emergence; norm enforcement; and the fundamental nature of
norms.
Suggested Areas for Future Research
The ﬁrst area requiring additional research is norm representation. Without an adequate
representation scheme, it is impossible to reason about or manipulate norms. Currently many
systems are implicit in their representation, but we have seen a trend towards attempting to develop
external formats and speciﬁcations; many of which are based on deontic logic. In some ways, this is
similar to the early days of logic-based AI. Representing norms as condition/action pairs of logical
statements seems fairly natural, but is it the most appropriate? Are there alternatives that can be
more easily manipulated by automated processes similar to evolutionary mechanics such that norm
creation and modiﬁcation are less challenging?
Research on norm creation, adaptation, and removal is currently under-represented in the published
literature, but recent research (Lopez-Sanchez et al. 2009) suggests that these topics are beginning
to receive more attention. In order to understand creation at the micro-level, we must ﬁrst understand
the process of ideation (how the idea for a behavior that becomes a norm initially appears) (Ehrlich
and Levin 2005). There is also the question of transmission's role in the norm creation process; can
the subjective (biased) interpretation of the observed behavior partly explain the emergence of new
norms (Henrich et al. 2008)? Furthermore, what is the role of the environment in norm creation
(Neumann 2010; Zhang and Leezer 2009)? Finally, do any existing search strategies, such as
Novelty Search (Stanley 2010) hold promise for discovering new behaviors? We have found a stark
lack of publications on the modiﬁcation of norms during the lifetime of an agent and the effect of
personal bias on the learning of new norms. We have also not seen any research concerned with the
ability to forget a norm after it has been learned. Both of these areas are critical to a theory of
normative evolution and may have far reaching applications in industrial systems where resources
are scarce or expensive.
Research into norm transmission through social learning mechanisms such as imitation has
increased over the past decade, but only a handful of papers (Nishizaki et al. 2008) investigate
methods other than imitation. Can the same learning mechanisms used by humans be applied to
artiﬁcial systems? What are those mechanisms? What lessons can we take from decades of
research on machine learning? Two interesting phenomenon that deserve further attention are
cognitive attractors and selective attention (Henrich et al. 2008). Cognitive attractors are clusters of
behavior form that serve as a template for what is "correct" to nearby agents seeking to conform.
Selective attention is the idea that agents are particular about who they learn from. In human
systems, it is not the case that an agent will be open to transmission from every neighbor in its social
network. The role of power in the transmission process has been identiﬁed as a critical factor in
human social systems, but it has not received as much attention as some (Ehrlich and Levin 2005;
Saam and Harrier 1999) deem necessary.
The use of social networks to analyze the underlying connection topologies of multi-agent systems
has also started to come into favor more recently. Experiments comparing emergence and spread
over lattice vs. power-law vs. random networks has shown that while there may not be extreme
differences in asymptotic time when the network is static, there is an effect in the short term and
when the networks are dynamic (Nakamarua and Levin 2004; Zhang and Leezer 2009). Do ideal
network structures exist for certain problem classes? How do hybrid networks perform (where a
hybrid network is deﬁned as a network made up of multiple sub-networks, each with a speciﬁc
topology)? What are the other differences between static and dynamic networks, and do the tools
exist to analyze norm evolution and emergence in dynamic networks?
One of the most critical areas that identiﬁed for research is the internalization process. At the
moment norms are generally internalized as soon as they are accepted. The BOIDS architecture
(Neumann 2010) isolates norms from personal desires, but does not provide a mechanism for their
transfer. There has been some work (Verhagen 2000) using the notion of an autonomy threshold for
the agent, where the autonomy value is used to inﬂuence the probability that an agent obeys a norm
over a personal desire, but this seems overly simplistic. Additionally, the choice to obey a norm is
typically deliberative and not random. Motivation is also missing from many of the current systems. A
theory of normative reasoning needs to be developed to address this challenge. However, in order
for internalization to happen at all the agent must ﬁrst be able to recognize and acquire a norm. With






does it infer what that norm may be? Perhaps more importantly, how does an agent know when there
should be a norm? Going back to the notion of normative reasoning, what is the role of ﬁltering
(Ehrlich and Levin 2005) in determining which norms are accepted or rejected? Finally, how do
agents solve conﬂicts that may arise when a norm is inconsistent with personal values? What if it is
unable to bear the cost of rejection?
The effect of social enforcement through the use of sanctions is fairly well established in the
literature. Experiments have shown that sanctions lead to norm stability, but only if the cost and force
of the sanction is within a "goldilocks zone" that appears to completely depend on the problem
context. Are there underlying models that can be used to explain and predict the effect of sanctions in
general? It has been mentioned that one of the deﬁning attributes of a norm is that it can be
disobeyed. How do sanctions impact this ability while still ensuring norm stability? Furthermore,
when should an agent disobey a norm and suffer the cost of a sanction? How much control should
norms have over an agent's behavior? Finally, are there alternatives to sanctions and social
enforcements, such as persuasion or altruism or benevolence, that can provide norm emergence
and stability (Ehrlich and Levin 2005)?
In addition to the challenges related directly to the normative processes we present in this paper,
there are still a number of basic science questions about norms must still be answered. For instance,
how do norms interact with other cultural and psychological factors? How do norms actually result in
coordination, cooperation, and organization? There are also challenges faced at a more practical
level, such as how do you conduct veriﬁcation and validation on normative systems and ensure that
the results are correct (Galan and Izquierdo 2005; Saam and Harrier 1999)? In particular, what
degree of sensitivity analysis and exploration of a normative system's parameter space is
appropriate? How important is it to let the system operate for extended periods of time to observe the
asymptotic effects, given the dynamic nature of social interaction and speed at which decision
trajectories change? Multi-agent systems often handle communication through specialized protocols
such as FIPA or KQML. Could this approach be extended to represent norms for inter- and intra-
agent communication?
We end our suggestions for future research with a ﬁnal question that connects normative systems to
their complex cousins: Is the emergence of norms an expected phenomenon of social systems? Is it
the natural result of social interaction under all possible conditions?
Summary and Conclusions
Normative multi-agent systems are a relatively new approach to addressing the challenges
encountered in open multi-agent systems. Norms form the basis of these systems, but pinning down
their exact nature and responsibilities is difﬁcult due to the diversity of existing deﬁnitions with
respect to the term norm. Norms have been deﬁned as behavioral constraints, obligations,
expectations, averages, solutions to macro-level problems, and regulatory and control devices for
decentralized systems. We choose to deﬁne them in a manner that offers compromise between the
differences, and suggest that norms are behavioral rules agreed upon by a sufﬁcient proportion of a
population; subject to willful violation and social enforcement. Norms can be acquired by local and
foreign agents through social and individual learning processes and are able spread beyond their
initial population and displace existing norms. Norms can further be deﬁned by categorizing them
based on morality, origin, economics, and function. Moral norms concerned with the behaviors an
agent ought to perform, regardless of any consequences. When categorized by origin, norms are
divided into those produced by a group in power, and those that emerge naturally though social
interaction. Economic categorizations look at norms in terms of their cost to members of a group. A
functional approach describes norms based on their effects within a society. Norms form the basis
for normative agents and normative multi-agent systems.
A normative multi-agent system is itself a multi-agent system built from normative agents, where
normative agents combine the concepts of norms with traditional agent concepts. Normative agents
must be able to represent norms, and current approaches accomplish this through the use of logic,
rule-based systems, binary strings, and implicit deﬁnition in game theory strategies. They must also
support a handful of processes that constitute a norm life cycle and encapsulate the critical
operations required to create, modify, detect, transmit, reason about, and enforce norms.
In the norm life cycle described in this paper, ideas that will become norms are created as part of an
evolutionary process. These new potential norms are then spread through active or passive
transmission techniques, depending on the system organization and allocation of control. As
neighboring agents are exposed to the new norms, social enforcement ensures that those norms are
acquired and internalized. Internalization refers to the shift in preference from the agent's original set
of norms to the newly acquired norms. It also signals a shift in enforcement from external pressures
to internal desires. This chain of transmission, enforcement, and internalization is known as
normative emergence. The emergence sub-process continues until the potential norms are acquired,
internalized, and rebroadcast by a sufﬁciently large subpopulation; at which point the potential norm6.4
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becomes an actual norm (which we simply call a norm.) Eventually, conditions change and it
becomes unreasonable to obey a particular norm. Consensus with regard to the norm disappears
and the norm becomes invalid. When existing norms are no longer suited to the current conditions,
they become candidates to be forgotten and new norms are created through an evolutionary process
that begins the cycle anew.
This norm life cycle model is constructed from the normative processes of creation, transmission,
enforcement, internalization, emergence, and evolution. Transmission describes how agent
relationship, transmission technique, and the network topology of agent connections impact the
spread of potential norms through a population. Enforcement handles norm recognition and
sanctions, including external and internal enforcement measures that coerce agents to adopt and
obey new norms, even when it may be against their individual interests. Internalization is responsible
for the principles behind norm acquisition and the effect that bias can have when adopting new
norms. The most common approach to internalization in existing normative multi-agent systems is
the idiom of acquisition is internalization. Emergence is the process in which transmission,
enforcement, and internalization converge to transform potential norms into societal norms,
spreading them through the population to produce macro-level cooperation behaviors. The ﬁnal
process, evolution, is an end-to-end process that unites emergence with norm creation, norm
modiﬁcation, and norm removal. Normative evolution describes the entire norm life cycle, from birth
to death.
Normative multi-agent systems are still searching for their true application domain, but much of the
existing work centers around using them to simulate social interaction and theories from the social
sciences, as well as solve problems related to open multi-agent systems. To date, normative multi-
agent systems have been used in research on coordination, cooperation, social control,
benevolence, reciprocity, trust, electronic institutions, agent architecture design, software
engineering, adaptive environmental control, and autonomous conﬁguration of ad-hoc networks.
The past twenty years have seen the research on normative agents and normative multi-agent
systems come a long way, but there are still signiﬁcant gaps in our knowledge of fundamental
concepts. There is a dire need to further research in the domains of norm representation; norm
creation, modiﬁcation, and removal; norm transmission and social learning; the application of social
networks analysis to normative emergence; norm internalization; norm enforcement; and even the
very deﬁnition of what it means for something to be a norm and the consequential behaviors and
expectations that follow. Only by challenging ourselves to step into the unknown and cross from the
world of the computational to the social can we hope to ﬁnd the answers we require for signiﬁcant
progress. It is our hope that this paper serves as a guide to new researchers and presents the topic
from an integrated perspective that illustrates the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of the
subject matter. After all, social norms govern almost every form of interaction (Young 2008), and the
future of agent-based computing is rooted in interaction.
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